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Boyle: All is Fair in Drugs and War: An Analysis of "Pay-For-Delay" Agr

ALL IS FAIR IN DRUGS AND WAR:
AN ANALYSIS OF “PAY-FOR-DELAY”
AGREEMENTS AND PRODUCT HOPPING
I. INTRODUCTION
Close your eyes and imagine one hundred Gulfstream Four jets. Now,
imagine one hundred of the super car Bugatti Veyron. Finally, imagine
your own private island. The amount of money that the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) estimates “pay-for-delay” agreements cost American
consumers annually could buy all of these things.1 Twice.2
In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act was introduced as a way for generic
drugs to enter the market before the expiration of brand-name patents,
thereby creating competition for brand-name drugs.3 The logic was
simple: increased competition will lead to lower prices on an essential
category of products.4 What Congress failed to take into account was the
most rudimentary goal of for-profit business: turning as high of a profit
as possible.5
The ultimate solution for brand-name pharmaceutical companies to
protect their profits was to collude with the generic pharmaceutical
companies.6 Brand-name pharmaceutical companies first began with
direct cash payments to generic pharmaceutical companies in exchange
for delaying the release of their product. 7 Then, brand-name companies
moved to indirect cash payments by way of conveying certain benefits. 8
Now, brand-name pharmaceuticals continue to find innovative ways to
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS
BILLIONS
(Jan.
2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billionsfederal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AL8FJY9] (explaining that “pay-for-delay” agreements are patent litigation settlements in which
a brand-name pharmaceutical company pays a generic pharmaceutical company a large
payment of some sort in exchange for delaying the generic drug’s entry into the market).
2
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2 (estimating that pay-for-delay agreements
cost consumers $3.5 billion every year).
3
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (outlining filing an abbreviated new drug application
under the Hatch-Waxman Act).
4
See Teresa Stanek Rea, Striking the Right Balance Between Innovation and Drug Price
Competition: Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act—An Introduction of Speakers, 54 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 223, 224 (1999) (stating that the goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to boost generic
competition in the market).
5
See Susannah Camic Tahk, Crossing the Tax Code’s For-Profit/Non-Profit Border, 118 PENN
ST. L. REV. 489, 491 (2014) (showing the goal of for-profit businesses, as characterized by the
tax code, as organizations created and operated for the purpose of making profits).
6
See infra Part II.B (exploring the legal background of pay-for-delay agreements).
7
See infra Section II.B.1 (reviewing pay-for-delay agreements involving direct cash
payments).
8
See infra Section II.B.2.
1
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form pay-for-delay agreements, all to the tune of an estimated $3.5 billion
of American consumers’ money per year. 9
The current legal scheme allowing generic pharmaceutical drugs to
enter the market before the expiration of the brand-name patent is being
exploited by both brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies to
maximize their profits at the expense of consumers through pay-for-delay
agreements.10 These agreements delay the release of generic drugs in
exchange for some type of payment from the brand-name pharmaceutical
company.11 In January 2010, the FTC issued a report on pay-for-delay
agreements that found these agreements are anticompetitive and cost
American consumers an estimated $3.5 billion each year. 12
Because brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies continue
to make and create new ways to make anticompetitive pay-for-delay
agreements, new amendments to legislation governing settlements
resulting from Paragraph IV Certification of generic drugs should be
introduced.13 These amendments would introduce caps on the term,
benefits conveyed and cash payments included in pay-for-delay
agreements, and impose penalties for anticompetitive behavior. 14 These
caps and penalties aim to deter and limit these settlements to facilitate the
introduction of generic competition to the market at the earliest possible
date while also allowing companies to conduct business and exercise their
patent rights.15
This Note explores pay-for-delay agreements and their negative
impact on antitrust law. First, Part II reviews the legal background of payfor-delay agreements.16 Second, Part III examines how courts have
handled and interpreted pay-for-delay agreements.17 Finally, Part IV

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2.
See infra Part III (analyzing the anticompetitive nature of pay-for-delay agreements and
the practice of product hopping).
11
See infra Part II.B (expounding upon the legal background of pay-for-delay agreements).
12
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2.
13
See infra Part III.D (discussing the need to amend the current legislation governing
Paragraph IV patent litigation); Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New
Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 499, 507 (2016) (elaborating that
an abbreviated new drug application that is filed for Paragraph IV Certification is
challenging the brand-name patent as invalid, that the filer’s product does not infringe upon
the brand-name patent, or both).
14
See infra Part IV.A (proposing new amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act).
15
See infra Part IV.A (stating the aims of the proposed new amendments to the HatchWaxman Act).
16
See infra Part II.
17
See infra Part III (analyzing cases about pay-for-delay agreements).
9

10
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presents a prospective amendment to the current legislation that limits
pay-for-delay agreements.18
II. BACKGROUND
Part II reviews the relevant legal background of generic drug market
entry and pay-for-delay agreements. First, this Part examines the HatchWaxman Act of 1984.19 Second, this Part reviews the history of pay-fordelay agreements.20 Third, this Part delves into an empirical study of payfor-delay agreements.21 Finally, it explores drug product selection
(“DPS”) laws and their role in product hopping. 22
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act
Ratified in 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted to promote more
innovation and boost generic competition in the market.23 This legislation
governs drug patent settlement agreements.24 One of the Hatch-Waxman
Act’s main goals was to cut both the time and cost of the generic drug
approval process.25 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires
that generic drugs have the same “dosage form, safety, strength, route of

18
See infra Part IV (advocating for an amendment to the current legislation that
specifically deals with pay-for-delay agreements).
19
See infra Part II.A.
20
See infra Part II.B.
21
See infra Part II.D (elaborating on the results of an empirical study of pay-for-delay
agreements).
22
See infra Part II.C (considering DPS laws and how they affect the realm of product
hopping).
23
See Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (showing that the goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to
stimulate drug innovation while also creating a quicker route to generic approval and entry
into the market); Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (2016) (denoting that the goal
of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase generic competition in the pharmaceutical
industry and foster innovation within the pharmaceutical industry); Feldman & Frondorf,
supra note 13, at 502 (articulating that the main goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance
“adequate patent protection for pioneer inventors with promoting the rapid introduction of
generics once this patent protection has expired”).
24
See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012) (explaining how the generic drug approval system works and
the guidelines and steps to follow when applying for early generic entry into the market);
Carrier, supra note 23, at 1012 (stating that the Hatch-Waxman Act governs drug patent
settlements); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 501–03 (describing how the HatchWaxman Act operates).
25
See Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (expounding that one of the goals of the Hatch-Waxman
Act was to bolster the avenue for low-cost generic drugs to gain approval); Feldman &
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 501 (noting that the Hatch-Waxman Act “created a pathway to
generic entry meant to incentivize the speedy introduction of generic drugs to market”).
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administration, quality, performance characteristics, and intended use.” 26
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic companies experimenting to
produce a copy of the brand-name drug were subject to infringement
violations, which means experiments could not be conducted until after
the patent expired.27 Included in the Hatch-Waxman Act was an
experiment exception to patent infringement that allowed a generic drug
company to use the patented active ingredient while experimenting to
develop a copy of the brand-name drug.28 This exception expedites the
process of getting new generic drugs to market after the patent for the
brand-name drug expires because it allows generic companies to develop
their generic version earlier.29 In addition to allowing generic drug
companies to use the brand-name active ingredient before patent
expiration, generic drug companies were also allowed to use the brandname drug’s findings for effectiveness and safety. 30
The Hatch-Waxman Act also provided a new avenue for generic
drugs to get to market prior to the expiration of the brand-name drug

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WHAT ARE GENERIC DRUGS?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. (June 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/
QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm [https://perma.cc/U6XL-LEDY].
27
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, U.S. CONG., 3
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/pharm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F7XE-R85G] (discussing how generic companies were subject to
infringement litigation for using a brand-name drug’s active ingredient while testing to
develop a generic version); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1013 (reviewing how prior to the HatchWaxman Act, it was considered patent infringement to use the active ingredient of a patented
drug for the purpose of experimenting to create a new generic version of the brand-name
drug).
28
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (explaining that it is permissible to use patented
inventions “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under Federal Law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products”); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 506 (stating that use
of the active ingredient of a brand-name drug by a generic for the purposes of creating a
generic version of that brand-name drug is not an act of patent infringement).
29
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 27, at 3 (expressing that the Hatch-Waxman Act
created an infringement exception that allowed generic drug manufacturers to use a
patented active ingredient before the patent’s expiration in an effort to speed up generic
entry into the market); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1013 (showing that with the passage of the
Hatch-Waxman Act Congress allowed generic drug manufacturers to use the patent active
ingredient of a drug for the purposes of experimentation with the aim of creating a generic
version of that patented drug).
30
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 27, at 3 (expounding that the Hatch-Waxman Act
eliminating the duplicative testing requirements that used to be in place); Carrier, supra note
23, at 1013 (noting that with the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act Congress allowed generic
drug manufacturers to use the findings for safety and effectiveness for the brand-name drug
in their application for generic approval).
26
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patent called an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”). 31 Under
the Act, generic drug companies could challenge a brand-name drug’s
patent in an attempt to gain early entry into the market.32 Commonly
referred to as Paragraph IV Certification, a generic drug company could
challenge the brand-name patent by either claiming the generic product
does not infringe on the patent, the patent is invalid, or both. 33 As an
incentive for generic drug companies to challenge brand-name patents,
the Hatch-Waxman Act gives the first ANDA to successfully complete
Paragraph IV Certification a 180-day period of market exclusivity.34
Filing for Paragraph IV Certification is regarded as a quasi-patent
infringement.35 Due to this quasi-patent infringement presumption,
brand-name drug companies may sue for infringement within forty-five
days of receiving notice from the first ANDA filer.36 If a brand-name drug
31
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (outlining the process and requirements of filing an
abbreviated new drug application under the Hatch-Waxman Act); Carrier, supra note 23, at
1013 (outlining how the Hatch-Waxman Act created a new route for generic approval in the
form of the abbreviated new drug application); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 501–
03 (expounding upon the process for generic certification under the Hatch-Waxman Act).
32
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2012) (creating an option for abbreviated new drug
applications to file for generic entry into the market before the expiration of the relevant
patent on the grounds that “such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted . . . ”);
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (describing the process of challenging a patent
under what is known as Paragraph IV certification); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1014 (stating a
Paragraph IV certification was a challenge to an existing patent).
33
See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 507 (elaborating that an abbreviated new drug
application that is filed for Paragraph IV Certification is challenging the brand-name patent
as invalid, claiming that the filer’s product does not infringe upon the brand-name patent,
or both); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1565 (2006) (showing that, for a Paragraph IV
certification to be successful, either the patent being challenged in the certification must be
invalid or the product of the company bringing the Paragraph IV certification must not
infringe the patent).
34
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(aa) (2012) (defining the 180-day exclusivity period);
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 508 (talking about how the exclusivity period that is
granted for being the first abbreviated new drug application filer is worth hundreds of
millions of dollars and represents a large majority of the profits that can be obtained by a
generic).
35
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (allowing for a drug company whose patent is being
challenge under Paragraph IV Certification to bring a patent infringement suit within fortyfive days of receiving notice of the Paragraph IV Certification challenge); Feldman &
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 507 (noting that filing an abbreviated new drug application for
Paragraph IV Certification is considered “an ‘artificial’ act of patent infringement”).
36
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (explaining that a drug company that owns a patent
being challenged under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv) is allowed to file a patent infringement
suit within forty-five days of receiving notice of the challenge); Hemphill, supra note 33, at
1566 (stating that patent holders often bring patent suits against companies that file for
Paragraph IV certification).
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company initiates an infringement suit within the allotted time period, a
thirty-month stay of approval for the ANDA is automatically granted. 37
The stay is lifted and the ANDA may be approved by the FDA if the thirtymonth period expires, the patent is ruled invalid by the courts, or there is
no appeal or affirmation of the judgment rendered in court. 38 It is the
litigation initiated by Paragraph IV Certification that results in pay-fordelay agreements.39
B. Pay-for-Delay Agreements
Around 2005, there was a spike in drug patent litigation settlements
involving delay to generic drug entry and compensation. 40 This spike led
to the FTC performing an investigation in 2010 in which it found “[p]ayfor-delay agreements have significantly postponed substantial consumer
savings from lower generic drug prices.”41 Part II.B explores the
progression of pay-for-delay agreements. First, it examines pay-for-delay
agreements involving direct cash payments through the lens of the
Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.42 Second, it explores payfor-delay agreements involving indirect cash payments by looking at the
37
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (discussing that, if a patent owner files a patent
infringement suit within forty-five days of receiving notice of a Paragraph IV Certification
challenge, a thirty-month stay of FDA approval is put into place and is active beginning on
the date that the notice was received); Mark S. Levy, Comment, Big Pharma Monopoly: Why
Consumers Keep Landing on “Park Place” and How the Game Is Rigged, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 247, 260
(2016) (describing how, upon a patent holder filing a patent infringement suit in response to
a Paragraph IV challenge, an automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval for the generic
drug involved in the suit is put into place).
38
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (expounding that the stay expires either after thirty
months or at an earlier or later date that has been determined by the court); Feldman &
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 509 (elaborating that FDA approval of the generic drug can only
occur either at the end of the thirty-month stay or by court order resulting from the patent
infringement suit that arose from the original Paragraph IV certification); Jennifer E. Sturiale,
Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation and Inter Partes Review: A New Sort of Competition, 69 ALA. L.
REV. 59, 72–73 (2017) (observing that a thirty-month stay of FDA approval is placed on the
ANDA as soon as a patent holder files for patent litigation in response to the application and
can be lifted by resolution of thirty months or a finding by the court that the patent being
challenged is either invalid or not infringed).
39
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 3 (detailing how pay-for-delay agreements
appear in the settlements of patent litigation between brand-name and generic
pharmaceutical companies); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 510 (surmising that the
rise of Paragraph IV certification in turn gave rise to the pay-for-delay strategy, which
became a tool of choice for brand-name pharmaceutical companies).
40
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1 (showing that, because of misapplication of
antitrust law by some appellate-level courts in 2005, pay-for-delay agreements saw a spike
in number).
41
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2.
42
See infra Section II.B.1.
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First Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust
Litigation.43 Finally, it considers pay-for-delay agreements and the
practice of product hopping.44
1.

Pay-for-Delay Agreements Involving Direct Cash Payments

Because the Hatch-Waxman Act provided generic drug companies a
way to enter the market prior to the expiration of a patent, brand-name
drug companies felt the sting where it hurt the most: their wallets.45 The
easiest way for the brand-name drug companies to preserve their profits
was to share some portion of those profits with the generic drug
companies in exchange for the promise not to enter the market for a certain
period of time.46 Justice Breyer explained direct cash payment pay-fordelay agreements best in his opinion for FTC v. Actavis, Inc. saying:
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement.
The two companies settle under terms that require
(1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the
patented product until the patent's term expires, and
(2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of
dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to
pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way
around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called
a “reverse payment” settlement agreement.47

See infra Section II.B.2.
See infra Section II.B.3.
45
See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 510 (noticing that the introduction of the
Hatch-Waxman Act put a large amount of brand-name drug companies’ profits at risk by
allowing generic competition to enter the market sooner than it had ever been allowed to
before); Sturiale, supra note 38, at 77 (stating that a Paragraph IV certification challenge to a
blockbuster drug is a tremendous financial risk to the brand-name pharmaceutical
company).
46
See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 510 (outlining how, facing the prospect of
possibly losing out on a substantial portion of profits, brand-name drug companies resorted
to the practice of pay-for-delay agreements); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1014 (2010)
(expounding upon the intricacies of pay-for-delay agreements, otherwise known as “reverse
payments”); Hemphill, supra note 33, at 1568 (explaining the basic structure of pay-for-delay
agreements where a patent holder pays the generic challenger in exchange for the generic
challenger delaying entry into the market); Sturiale, supra note 38, at 76 (noting the large
incentive for brand-name pharmaceutical companies to settle Paragraph IV patent litigation,
including the preservation of the enormous amount of resources expended in developing the
drug, the amount of time spent researching the drug, and the difficulty of achieving FDA
approval for new, original drugs).
47
F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
43
44
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By flipping the script on the traditional notion of a settlement, brand-name
drug companies found a solution to their generic competition problem
that not only worked for them but also for the generic drug companies. 48
Congress attempted to dissuade these types of agreements by introducing
the Medicare Modernization Act in 2003 that, among other things,
amended the Hatch-Waxman Act to provide that any first ANDA filer that
agrees to a pay-for-delay agreement would forfeit their 180-day period of
market exclusivity.49 The Medicare Modernization Act did not do much
to curb the amount of pay-for-delay agreements, however, as the study
conducted by the FTC shows that a rise in such agreements occurred in
2005, two years after the introduction of the amendment. 50
Finally, in 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., a case involving a pay-for-delay agreement.51 In 2003,
Actavis (known as Watson Pharmaceuticals at the time) filed an ANDA
along with two other generic drug companies for a generic drug based on
AndroGel, a drug produced by the brand-name drug company Solvay

48
See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 510 (describing pay-for-delay agreements as
“an ingenious approach in which the brand-name drug company shares a portion of its
monopoly profits with the generic company in exchange for the generic company agreeing
to stay out of the market”); Hemphill, supra note 33, at 1568 (“Innovators faced with generic
competition have shown considerable ingenuity in maximizing the returns from a successful
drug.”); Sturiale, supra note 38, at 77–78 (stating that generic pharmaceutical companies are
incentivized to settle Paragraph IV patent litigation by the large sums of money offered by
the brand-name pharmaceutical companies and the elimination of risk associated with
patent litigation); Sturiale, supra note 38, at 77 (observing that brand-name pharmaceutical
companies are incentivized to settle Paragraph IV patent certification to preserve the amount
of time and resources expended to develop the brand-name drug).
49
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (2012). One of the forfeiture events described in the
Medicare Modernization Act that amended the Hatch-Waxman Act occurs when:
[t]he first applicant enters into an agreement with . . . an owner of the
patent that is the subject of the certification under paragraph
(2)(A)(vii)(IV), the Federal Trade Commission or the Attorney General
files a complaint, and there is a final decision of the Federal Trade
Commission or the court with regard to the complaint from which no
appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari) has been or can be taken that the agreement has violated the
antitrust laws.
Id.
50
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1 (denoting a spike in the number of pay-fordelay agreements starting in 2005 and increasing over the next four years into 2009).
51
See generally Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2227–30 (outlining the basic pay-for-delay
agreement and discussing the Court’s decision to hear the case). See also Feldman &
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 513 (showing that the Supreme Court granted certiorari for F.T.C.
v. Actavis, Inc. in order to rule on the antitrust implications of pay-for-delay agreements);
Levy, supra note 37, at 254 (displaying that the Supreme Court granted certiorari and ruled
on pay-for-delay agreements in F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc.).
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Pharmaceuticals.52 Upon receiving notice of the filing, Solvay initiated a
patent infringement suit against Actavis and the other filers, which
triggered the automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval.53 While
patent litigation was ongoing, the automatic stay expired and the ANDAs
that were first filed received their approval from the FDA.54 Then, in 2006,
Solvay Pharmaceuticals settled the patent litigation with Actavis and the
other filers.55 The terms of the settlement dictated that Actavis promised
not to enter the market for AndroGel until 2015 and also promised to
promote the brand-name product for Solvay in exchange for what was
estimated to be somewhere between $19–30 million dollars annually for
the next nine years.56 The FTC filed a lawsuit against the settling parties
in 2009 and lost both in district and appellate court before being granted
certiorari.57
The Court in Actavis, Inc. had two objectives while writing its opinion:
determining whether pay-for-delay agreements could be challenged and,
if so, whether they violate antitrust law.58 The Court stated that
inappropriate use of monopoly powers granted by a patent was invalid.59
Because these agreements prevent competition from entering the market,
execution of these agreements could potentially be an inappropriate use
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (explaining that Actavis had filed an abbreviated new
drug application for AndroGel, a Solvay product, in 2003); Joseph Fielding, From Pay-ForDelay to Product Hopping: The Limited Utility of Antitrust Law in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 1915, 1928 (2017) (observing that Actavis and the other defendants filed
Paragraph IV ANDAs in 2003).
53
See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013) (stating that Solvay commenced
Paragraph IV patent litigation with Actavis in response to Actavis filing an abbreviated new
drug application concerning a patent Solvay owned for AndroGel); Fielding, supra note 52,
at 1928 (showing that, in response to the Paragraph IV ANDAs filed, Solvay initiated a patent
infringement suit).
54
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (expounding that thirty months after Solvay initiated
patent litigation the FDA approved the first filed abbreviated new drug applications for
AndroGel); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1928 (articulating that a thirty-month stay of FDA
approval was put into place when the patent litigation was initiated).
55
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (presenting that, even though the first filing
abbreviated new drug applications received FDA approval, the patent litigation started by
Solvay concerning those same applications was settled by all parties); Fielding, supra note 52,
at 1928 (specifying that Actavis and the other filers decided to forgo the 180-exclusivity
period to settle with Solvay instead).
56
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
57
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229–30.
58
Compare Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2227 (stating that the appellate court viewed pay-fordelay agreements as generally immune from antitrust law, but the Supreme Court
disagreed), with F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (2012) (surmising that
pay-for-delay agreements are generally immune from antitrust law).
59
See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) (discussing the Court’s holding in
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948), pertaining to the interaction between
patent law and antitrust law).
52
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of patent powers under antitrust law.60 Thus, their validity can be
challenged in court.61 Moving on to the anticompetitive effects of the
agreement, the Court found that the large sum paid in exchange for
delaying the release of the generic drug was likely forbidden by antitrust
law.62 At the beginning of its analysis, the Court decided that the rule of
reason test was proper and laid out five factors to apply when looking at
the anticompetitive nature of pay-for-delay agreements.63 During its
analysis, the Court stated that companies with the power to pay “large
sums” in exchange for not entering the market are those with “higherthan-competitive profits.”64 It held that the agreements that raise
suspicion are those that exceed the estimated cost of the patent litigation
and involve a highly profitable party because only those companies with
such power are equipped to execute an anticompetitive pay-for-delay
See id. at 2227 (saying the alleged agreement could at times violate antitrust law);
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 513 (recounting that, while the Supreme Court stopped
short of declaring reverse payment settlements, the Court held that reverse payment
settlements may be anticompetitive and are open to antitrust scrutiny); Sturiale, supra note
38, at 64 (voicing that the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. held that reverse payment
settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation could sometimes be
anticompetitive and in violation of antitrust law); Francisco Javier Espinosa, Big Pharma
Versus Inter Partes Review: Why the Pharmaceutical Industry Should Seek Logical Hatch-Waxman
Reform Over Inter Partes Review Exemption, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337, 356 (2017) (expressing
that the Supreme Court held that reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV
patent litigation could at times be in violation of antitrust law and, as such, should be subject
to antitrust scrutiny).
61
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231–32 (showing that the appellate court was applying
the incorrect test when it affirmed); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1931 (delineating how the
Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh Circuit was incorrect in applying a scope of patent
test to analyze reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation
because Paragraph IV patent litigation is challenging validity of the patent, and, if the parties
do not settle and the court finds the patent invalid, the patent in question would have no
scope or, if the court did not find infringement, stalling generic competition from entering
the market would be beyond the scope of the patent in question).
62
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (stating that if the basic reason for the agreements is
to preserve and share patent-generated profit, they likely violate antitrust law); Feldman &
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 513 (elaborating that the Supreme Court held that pay-for-delay
agreements are vulnerable to antitrust scrutiny).
63
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231–32; Fielding, supra note 52, at 1933 (specifying that the
Supreme Court, in lieu of a bright line rule, laid out five separate factors that should be used
in a rule of reason analysis when examining reverse payment settlements that arise out of
Paragraph IV patent litigation); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 513–14 (voicing that
the Supreme Court decided on a rule of reason analysis instead of a quick look analysis when
deciding FTC v. Actavis, Inc.).
64
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231–32 (explaining that firms can pay “large sums” to
decrease competition and entice generics to stay “out of their market”); Fielding, supra note
52, at 1931 (elucidating that Solvay, if the patent was valid and infringed, would have the
ability to make “higher-than-competitive” profits, which suggests that Solvay had the ability
to make the type of payment that the Supreme Court held could potentially be violating
antitrust law).
60
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agreement.65 At the end of its opinion, the Court remanded the case and
instructed the lower courts to structure a rule of reason test for the issue.66
Because this was the first time the Supreme Court had ruled on this issue
of law, it was inevitable that more suits would follow requiring further
interpretation of the Actavis, Inc. decision.67
2.

Pay-for-Delay Agreements Involving Indirect Cash Payments

After Actavis, Inc. was decided, a new kind of pay-for-delay
agreement arose in which a benefit, instead of cash, was conveyed to the
generic challenger.68 It did not take long for these new payments to be
challenged in court.69 Mainly, the goal was to determine whether this kind
of pay-for-delay agreement fell under the power of Actavis, Inc.70
See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (surmising that pay-for-delay
agreements become unjustified when they convey a payment that surpassed the estimated
cost of the Paragraph IV patent litigation the settlement resulted from); Fielding, supra note
52, at 1932 (specifying that large payments from brand-name pharmaceutical companies to
generic pharmaceutical companies can be used as evidence of the settlement’s
anticompetitive nature).
66
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (remanding and instructing the lower courts to
structure a new rule of reason test); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 514 (recounting
that the Supreme Court, while holding that a rule of reason analysis was the correct vehicle
to examine reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation, left
the structuring of the rule of reason analysis to the lower courts upon remand); Edward D.
Cavanagh, Whatever Happened to Quick Look?, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 39, 57 (expressing that
the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. held that a rule of reason analysis was the correct
way of examining reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent
litigation, and the lower courts are to structure the rule of reason analysis consistent with
their opinion).
67
See generally King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388,
393 (3d Cir. 2015) (expounding that the Third Circuit was asked to consider whether Actavis
should be extended to settlement agreements that result from Paragraph IV patent litigation
that do not involve a direct cash payment); In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538,
542 (1st Cir. 2016) (considering whether or not to extend Actavis to settlement agreements
that result from Paragraph IV patent litigation that do not “involve reverse payments in pure
cash form”).
68
See King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 393 (discussing a pay-for-delay agreement
in which the brand-name pharmaceutical company promised not to make an authorized
generic in exchange for delay); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 517 (elaborating on
pay-for-delay agreements that include benefits such as the right to manufacture an
authorized generic).
69
See generally King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 393–413 (outlining a case against
a brand-name pharmaceutical company for its pay-for-delay agreement that involved not
producing an authorized generic in exchange for delay); In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 541–42
(specifying a case in which a generic agreed to delay the entry of its drug in exchange for a
promise from the patent holder not to release an authorized generic upon the generic’s entry
to the market).
70
See King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 393 (stating that the court is to determine
whether a pay-for-delay agreement that conveys benefits as opposed to cash is covered by
65
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Eventually, the court in In re Loestrin 24 decided to extend Actavis, Inc. to
pay-for-delay agreements involving an indirect cash payment.71
On February 17, 2006, the FDA approved Warner Chilcott’s New
Drug Application (“NDA”) for an oral contraceptive dosing regimen
named Loestrin 24.72 A few months after gaining FDA-approval, Warner
received notice that Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. had filed a Paragraph
IV Certification ANDA for a generic version of Loestrin 24.73 Warner then
filed an infringement suit against Watson, triggering the thirty-month
automatic stay.74 Before the stay expired in January 2009, Warner and
Watson reached a settlement agreement in which Warner agreed, among
other things,75 to grant Watson a license to produce a generic Loestrin 24
and not to grant any other company such a license until at least 180 days
after Watson came to market in exchange for Watson delaying its entry
into the market until January 22, 2014.76 Half a year after Warner and
Watson made their deal, Warner received notice that Lupin
Pharmaceuticals filed a Paragraph IV Certification ANDA for a generic
version of Loestrin.77 Warner sued Lupin for patent infringement in 2009,
and the two companies settled in 2010.78 In the settlement, Warner agreed
to grant Lupin licenses to market the generic version of two different
drugs not related to Loestrin 24 in exchange for Lupin delaying its entry
into the Loestrin 24 market until July 22, 2014, or after the period of

Actavis); In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 542 (expressing that the issue at hand was whether or
not the Supreme Court’s ruling in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. extended to reverse payment
settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation where the reverse payment was
not a pure cash payment).
71
See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 542.
72
See id. at 545.
73
See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 545 (1st Cir. 2016).
74
See id. at 546 (denoting that Warner filed for Paragraph IV patent litigation, which
triggered the automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval for abbreviated new drug
application). See also 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (stating that, if a patent owner files a
patent infringement suit with forty-five days of receiving notice of a Paragraph IV
Certification challenge, a thirty-month stay of FDA approval is put into place and is active
beginning on the date that the notice was received); Hemphill, supra note 33, at 1566
(showing that patent holders often bring patent suits against the generic companies that file
for Paragraph IV certification).
75
See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 538, 546 (specifying that Warner also agreed to pay
Watson “annual fees and a percentage of net sales” from Watson's co-promotion of Femring
and “the exclusive right to earn brand sales” for the Warner product Generess Fe).
76
See id. at 546.
77
See id. (expounding that Lupin Pharmaceuticals sent notice that it had filed an
abbreviated new drug application to market a generic version of Loestrin 24 on July 30, 2009).
78
See id. at 547. See also 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (describing that if a patent owner
files a patent infringement suit, a thirty-month stay of FDA approval is put into place and is
active beginning on the date that the notice was received); Hemphill, supra note 33, at 1566.
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exclusivity Warner had previously negotiated with Watson had expired. 79
Following the two agreements, a class of Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs and
End Payor Plaintiffs filed antitrust claims against the parties of both
agreements.80
The court’s objective in In re Loestrin was to determine whether Actavis
extended to non-cash payments.81 Whereas the district court concluded
that Actavis, Inc. only applied to agreements in which cash was paid, the
circuit court disagreed.82 The circuit court instead decided that Actavis,
Inc. should be read to include non-cash payments, noting the Third
Circuit’s decision in King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.83
Using the Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “payment,” the court
reasoned that payment was a broad category that included the giving of
money or something else of value.84 Logically, the court then concluded
that Actavis, Inc. covered non-cash payments because these payments
conveyed something of value from one party to another.85 The court
stated that for a pay-for-delay agreement to violate antitrust law, the
brand-name pharmaceutical company must make a “large and
unjustifiable” payment to the generic pharmaceutical company. 86 The
79
See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 547 (1st Cir. 2016) (showing that
Lupin agreed to delay the entry of its generic version of Loestrin 24 in exchange for the
licenses to market Femcon Fe and the generic version of Asacol).
80
See id. at 542 (expounding that two putative classes of plaintiffs filed antitrust claims
against the agreements between Warner, Watson, and Lupin).
81
See id. at 549. See also F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (explaining that
cash payment pay-for-delay agreements could violate antitrust law but did not rule on payfor-delay agreements that convey a benefit); Samuel N. Weinstein, Rigged Results? Antitrust
Lessons from Keyword Auctions, 91 TUL. L. REV. 629, 688 (2017) (elucidating that the lower court
was deciding whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis applied to non-cash forms of
payment involved in reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent
litigation).
82
See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 542; Weinstein, supra note 81, at 688 (voicing that the
First Circuit disagreed with and vacated the district court’s decision that Actavis only applied
to pure cash payments).
83
See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550 (noting how other circuits have held that Actavis
applies to non-cash payments); King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.,
791 F.3d 388, 406 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing how the patent holder leverages power to create
an anticompetitive effect); Weinstein, supra note 81, at 688 (expressing that both circuits held
that the Supreme Court’s Actavis holding does in fact apply to non-cash forms of payment
involved in reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation).
84
See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550.
85
See id. (elaborating how non-cash payments were covered by Actavis even though the
Supreme Court refers directly to monetary payments); Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (“[I]n
substance, the plaintiff agreed to pay the defendants many millions of dollars to stay out of
its market.”).
86
In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 552 (1st Cir. 2016). See also Actavis,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (explaining that “[A] reverse payment, where large and unjustified,
can bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive effects . . . ”); Fielding, supra note 52,
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court reasoned that the plaintiff did not need to provide precise statistics
of the payment for various reasons. 87 It required that the plaintiff allege
facts that could support that the agreement was large and unjustifiable but
did not define what kind of facts would qualify as providing that kind of
support.88 The court vacated the judgment of the lower court and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with their opinion. 89
3.

Pay-for-Delay Agreements and Product Hopping

After the Actavis, Inc. and In re Loestrin decisions, it became clear that
both brand-name companies involved in each decision were now
exposing themselves to potential legal liability by entering into pay-fordelay agreements.90 This potential legal liability prompted brand-name
drug companies to move toward the practice known as product
hopping.91 The practice of product hopping starts with reformulating a
drug with a patent that is about to expire to produce a slightly newer
version of the drug that can receive a new patent. 92 Once the

at 1932 (specifying that large payments from brand-name pharmaceutical companies to
generic pharmaceutical companies can be used as evidence of the settlement’s
anticompetitive nature).
87
The type of evidence that the plaintiff would need to make out the precise figures of a
large and unjustifiable payment is more than likely going to be in the exclusive possession
of the defendant. In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 552 (“[V]ery precise and particularized
estimates of fair value and anticipated litigation costs may require evidence in the exclusive
possession of the defendants, as well as expert analysis.”).
88
See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 552 (outlining that a plaintiff must still allege enough
facts to show that, as a matter of law, the payment is large and unjustifiable). But see also id.
(showing that, while the court required the plaintiff to allege facts to show that a payment
was large and unjustifiable, it failed to define what kind of facts would provide support for
such an allegation).
89
See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 553.
90
See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (finding that settlement
agreements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation could sometimes violate antitrust
law); In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550 (choosing to extend Actavis to include indirect cash
payments involved with settlement agreements resulting from Paragraph IV patent
litigation).
91
See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642–43 (2d Cir. 2015)
(discussing Actavis PLC’s anticompetitive “forced-switch scheme” and how it would “likely
impede generic competition”); In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247, 253 (D. Mass.
2017) (stating that the plaintiffs alleged that defendants were involved in “an anticompetitive
scheme that included product hopping that constituted monopolization”); Carrier, supra
note 23, at 1010–11 (explaining that pharmaceutical companies engage in the practice of
product hopping).
92
There are three different types of reformulation that are employed during the practice
of product hopping. Carrier, supra note 23, at 1016–17. First, the drug manufacturer can
change the form from the original (such as tablets or capsules) to another different form. Id.
Second, the drug manufacturer can add or remove molecular compounds to create a new
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reformulation is complete and a patent is obtained, the brand-name drug
company can perform either a hard switch or a soft switch. 93 A hard
switch occurs when a brand-name drug company introduces a new
version of a drug and subsequently pulls the old version of the drug off
the shelf completely or restricts access to the old drug once the new
version of the drug has entered the market.94 A soft switch occurs when a
brand-name drug company introduces and markets a new version of a
drug but keeps the old version of the drug on the market. 95 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit court to address product
hopping.96
In New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, Actavis was the
producer of the drugs Namenda IR and Namenda XR. 97 With strong
generic competition eminent in the IR market, Actavis created and
brought Namenda XR to market two years prior to the tentative generic
entry date.98 While both the IR and XR version of Namenda were available
composition. Id. Third, a drug manufacturer can produce a composite drug by combining
two or more existing, separate drugs into one. Id.
93
See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (considering the differences between soft and hard
switches); In re Asacol, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 256–58 (expounding upon the anticompetitive hard
switch being alleged); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1016–22 (exploring the process and market
entry timing associated with the practice of product hopping); Fielding, supra note 52, at
1934–35 (outlining how Forest Laboratories, a subsidiary of Actavis, performed both a soft
switch, in which it used aggressive marketing to convince consumers to switch from
Namenda IR to Namenda XR, and a hard switch, in which Forest Laboratories restricted
access to the IR version of the drug).
94
See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (noting the definition of a hard switch); In re Asacol, 233
F. Supp. 3d at 256–58 (reviewing the alleged anticompetitive hard switch from Asacol to
Delzicol); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1934–35 (denoting how Forest Laboratories executed a
hard switch tactic involving Namenda IR and XR by restricting access to the older Namenda
IR when the patent for Namenda IR was about to expire because Namenda XR had patent
rights through 2029).
95
See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (exploring the definition of a soft switch); In re Asacol,
233 F. Supp. 3d at 269 (expounding upon what constitutes a soft switch and why it is not
anticompetitive); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1934–35 (outlining Forest Laboratories soft switch
strategy with Namenda IR and Namenda XR, which consisted of aggressive marketing
aimed at convincing consumers to switch from Namenda IR to Namenda XR).
96
See Kieran Meagher, Note, Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Mylan’s Ability to Monopolize
Reflects Major Weaknesses, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 589, 605 (2017).
97
See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 2015)
(presenting that Actavis was the producer of the drugs Namenda XR and Namenda IR);
Fielding, supra note 52, at 1934 (denoting that Forest Laboratories, a subsidiary of Actavis,
was the producer of Namenda IR and Namenda XR).
98
See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646–47 (showing that Actavis created and began to market
Namenda XR two years before the entry date of generic competition); Levy, supra note 37, at
278 (explaining that the patent holder created a new version of Namenda in an attempt to
avoid the impending patent cliff); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1934 (articulating that Forest
Laboratories, a subsidiary of Actavis, began aggressively marketing Namenda XR in 2013,
which is two years prior to the expiration of Namenda IR’s patent).
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at the time of Namenda XR’s market entry, Actavis stopped actively
marketing Namenda IR upon Namenda XR’s entry.99 Actavis also
employed a myriad of tactics to induce patients currently taking Namenda
IR to switch to Namenda XR.100 After performing these strategies, Actavis
decided to completely remove Namenda IR from the market.101 While
Actavis was in the process of pulling Namenda IR from the market, the
state of New York filed suit against Actavis alleging that the planned
withdrawal of Namenda IR from the market constituted a hard switch and
was in violation of antitrust law.102
The court in Actavis PLC was attempting to determine the
anticompetitive nature of the practice of product hopping. 103 The Actavis
PLC court used existing case law when determining the test for measuring
the anticompetitiveness of product hopping.104 The court determined that
for product hopping to be unlawfully anticompetitive it must both coerce
consumers and impede competition. 105 When detailing what would
constitute coercing consumers and impeding competition, the court stated
that both occur “when a monopolist combines product withdrawal with
some other conduct, the overall effect of which is to coerce consumers
rather than persuade them on the merits and to impede competition.” 106
The court determined that Actavis’s withdrawal of Namenda IR from the

99
See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (stating that Actavis stopped actively marketing the IR
version of Namenda when initially began to offer the XR version of Namenda); Fielding,
supra note 52, at 1934.
100
First, Actavis spent considerable amounts of money to promote Namenda XR to
doctors, pharmacists, caregivers, etc. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 638. Second, Actavis sold
Namenda XR at a discounted rate, making it more affordable than the previous Namenda
IR. Id. Third, Actavis issued rebates to health care providers for Namenda XR in an attempt
to persuade them to push for more prescriptions of the drug. Id.
101
See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (presenting that on February 14, 2014, Actavis
announced that it was discontinuing the IR version of Namenda on August 15, 2014); Levy,
supra note 37, at 278; Fielding, supra note 52, at 1935 (elaborating that, once Namenda XR
entered the market, Forest Laboratories began restricting access to Namenda IR).
102
See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 649; Fielding, supra note 52, at 1935 (showing that New York
alleged that Actavis, through their Forest Laboratories subsidiary, was liable for antitrust
violations because of the hard switch tactics employed during Namenda XR’s introduction
to the market that restricted access to Namenda IR with the intention of pulling the drug off
the market).
103
See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 642–43 (describing the scheme used by Actavis PLC that
was alleged by New York to be an anticompetitive product hopping scheme); Fielding, supra
note 52, at 1936 (denoting that the central issue of the case was whether or not Forest
Laboratories was intentionally attempting to maintain monopoly power in the U.S.
memantine drug market by way of a product hopping scheme).
104
See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 652 (2d Cir. 2015).
105
See id.
106
Id. at 654.
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market was anticompetitive and granted the state of New York a
preliminary injunction against its withdrawal. 107
The resulting fallout of Actavis PLC includes the case In re Asacol
Antitrust Litigation. The court in In re Asacol found that Warner Chilcott’s
conduct with the products Asacol, Asacol HD, and Delzicol was not
anticompetitive because it was not a hard switch. 108 The court said that
because the hard switch was directed at Delzicol and because Asacol and
Asacol HD were both available at the same time there could not be a hard
switch from Asacol.109
C. Drug Product Selection Laws
By 1984, all states had adopted some form of drug product selection
(“DPS”) laws.110 These types of laws allow pharmacists to substitute
pricier brand-name medication with a cheaper generic equivalent.111 One
reason DPS laws were enacted in the states was so pharmacists would
have more incentive than doctors to pick the cheaper generic drug and
save consumers money.112 The FTC found:

107
See id. at 663 (affirming the district court’s order granting the state of New York a
preliminary injunction against the removal of Namenda IR from its respective market); Levy,
supra note 37, at 278 (expounding that the Second Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction
originally issued by the district court); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1936 (showing that the
Second Circuit agreed with the state that the hard switch tactics used by Forest Laboratories
in conjunction with the release of Namenda XR constituted an intentional attempt to
maintain monopoly power under a product hopping scheme and enjoined Actavis from
pulling Namenda IR off of the market prior to the expiration of its patent in 2015).
108
See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247, 268 (D. Mass. 2017).
109
See id.
110
See MASSON & STEINER, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES:
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1 (Oct.
1985), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-substitutionprescription-drug-prices-economic-effects-state-drug-product-selection-laws/
massonsteiner.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MGY-ZPJ4] (denoting that by mid-1984 all states had
enacted some form of drug product selection law).
111
See id. at 1 (explaining that drug product selection laws allow pharmacists to substitute
generic equivalents for brand-name drugs in certain cases); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1017
(elaborating on how laws allow pharmacists to substitute brand-name medication for
generic); Richard Cauchi, State Laws and Legislation Related to Biologic Medications and
Substitution of Biosimilars, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURE (June 1, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/Biologics_BiosimilarsNCSLReport2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GXV4-Y86P] (exploring state laws that denote when generic medication
can be substituted for brand-name medication by pharmacists).
112
See MASSON & STEINER, supra note 110, at 1 (“The premise underlying DPS laws is that
the pharmacist has a greater incentive than the physician to identify the cheapest source of
supply and to pass along at least part of the savings to the consumer.”); Carrier, supra note
23, at 1017–18 (stating that pharmacists must respond with consumer demand in order to
compete in the pharmacy industry).
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Physicians' behavior reveals not only a marked
preference for prescribing brand-name drugs but also for
specifying the first brand marketed in a drug entity. In
the absence of substitution, this proclivity towards
prescribing the pioneer brand in effect extends the drug's
dominance even after the expiration of the patent which
conferred the initial legal monopoly. 113
Prior to DPS laws, physicians were the ones who made the decision of
which medication a patient would receive. 114 If the physician prescribed
a brand-name medication, the pharmacist would provide that medication,
even if there was a cheaper generic equivalent available.115
DPS laws seek to transfer to the pharmacists some of the power to
decide which medications consumers will pay for. 116 There are two
reasons behind this rationale.117 First, the amount of different choices in
pharmacies creates competitive prescription prices, which means
pharmacists must respond to consumer demand in order to compete for
business.118 Second, there is an incentive to fill prescriptions with generic
medication because pharmacies typically gross more money on generic
medication.119 Congress surmised that the combination of these factors
and the authority to fill brand-name prescriptions with a generic
equivalent would increase consumer savings.120
D. The Empirical Values of Pay-for-Delay Agreements
Having an interest in the economic impacts of pay-for-delay
agreements, Ruben Jacobo-Rubio, John L. Turner, and Johnathon W.
Williams performed an empirical study to analyze two different values
associated with Paragraph IV patent litigation pay-for-delay
agreements.121 First, the study investigates value of deterrence for brand-

MASSON & STEINER, supra note 110, at 6.
See id. at 5.
115
See id. at 6 (expressing that without the option of substitution consumers do not get to
exercise choice when choosing medication).
116
See id. at 7.
117
See id.
118
See id.
119
See id.
120
See id. (discussing how drug product selection laws take advantage of pharmacists’
increased incentive to fill prescriptions with generic equivalents to offer savings to
consumers).
121
See Ruben Jacobo-Rubio et al., The Distribution of Surplus in the US Pharmaceutical
Industry: Evidence from Paragraph (iv) Patent Litigation Decisions 2 (Jan. 21, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
113
114
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name pharmaceutical companies.122 Second, the researchers determine
the value of entry for generic pharmaceutical companies.123 Third, the
study explores the relationship between the values of deterrence and entry
and drug sales.124 Finally, the authors review the implications that the
2002 decision in Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C. had on pay-for-delay
agreements.125
The phrase value of deterrence refers to the potential value gained,
expressed in United States Dollars (USD), by brand-name pharmaceutical
companies for deterring and restricting competition. 126 By using
particular economic equations, the authors determined a dispute value.127
In other words, the estimated dispute value for brand-name
pharmaceutical companies represents the value of deterrence. 128 Using
their specific economic equations, the authors were able to determine that
the average value of deterrence for brand-name pharmaceutical
companies is $4.6 billion.129
The phrase value of entry is the other side of value of deterrence’s
coin. Value of entry is used to define the potential value gained, expressed
in USD, by generic pharmaceutical companies for gaining entry into a
market via Paragraph IV Certification. 130 Similar to value of deterrence,
the dispute value for generic pharmaceutical companies represents the
value of entry.131 The differences between the two values is derived from
the difference in value of the variables that are input into the authors’
economic equations.132 Again, using their economic equations, the

2481908 [https://perma.cc/7ABT-MQ46] (elaborating on the empirical study performed to
analyze values associated with pay-for-delay agreements).
122
See id. at 3.
123
See id.
124
See id. at 4.
125
See id.
126
See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 22–29 (reviewing the meaning of the phrase value
of deterrence).
127
See id. at 12 (outlining the two economic equations used to determine dispute value, in
which the value of deterrence uses the equation VWinB - VLossB and the value of entry uses the
equation VWinG - VLossG).
128
See id. at 29 (implying that when a dispute value is calculated using the variables of
brand-name pharmaceutical companies, the resulting dispute value is value of deterrence).
129
See id. (stating that when the proper variables are input into the equation VWinB - VLossB,
the resulting average value of deterrence for brand-name pharmaceutical companies was
$4.6 billion).
130
See id. at 30 (explaining that the value of entry means the oligopolistic profit that could
be realized through patent litigation).
131
See id. at 29.
132
See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 43 (displaying a table that denotes these
differences).
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authors were able to determine that the average value of entry for generic
pharmaceutical companies was $236.8 million. 133
Although the difference in the size between brand-name and generic
pharmaceutical companies plays its part, the staggering monetary
difference between the values of deterrence and entry reveals what the
authors refer to as a “strong asymmetric” relationship.134 The average
value of entry only makes up 5.1% of the average value of deterrence. 135
When viewing the relationship between the values through the context of
drug sales, a one-dollar increase in sales for a drug increases the value of
deterrence by $7.19.136 When subjected to the same scenario stated in the
previous sentence, the value of entry only increases by $0.19.137
In Schering-Plough, two drug manufacturers sued the FTC in the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn an FTC order to cease and
desist settlements in patent litigation. 138 The court sided with the drug
manufacturers and overturned the order, which legitimized the use of
settlements in patent litigation.139 The authors of the study reviewed the
differences in value of deterrence and value of entry both prior to and after
Schering-Plough.140 They found that the value of deterrence dropped from
$8.8 billion prior to Schering-Plough to $3.5 billion after Schering-Plough,
and the value of entry dropped from $532 million to $173.5 million. 141 The
authors also observed that the drop in the values of deterrence and entry
after Schering-Plough occurred in spite of the fact that drug sales were
nearly double during this period.142 This observation led the authors to
suggest that the average level of competition in the pharmaceutical market
has dropped since the decision in Schering-Plough.143

133
See id. at 29 (elaborating that when the correct variables are used for the equation VWinG
- VLossG, the resulting average value of entry for generic pharmaceutical companies was
$236.8 million).
134
See id. (noting the highly-skewed nature of the relationship between the value of
deterrence and the value of entry).
135
See id. at 29 (noticing that the average value of entry of $236.8 million only comprises
5.1% of the average value of deterrence of $4.6 billion).
136
See id. at 31 (“A one-dollar increase in a drug’s sales is associated with a $7.19 increase
in brand-firm stakes.”).
137
See id. (“A one-dollar increase in a drug’s sales is associated with a $0.19 increase in
generic-firm stakes.”).
138
See Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005).
139
See id. at 1073–76 (explaining that the FTC order unreasonably restrains trade and must
be overturned).
140
See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 32–33 (exploring the economic impacts of the court’s
decision in Schering-Plough).
141
See id. at 33.
142
See id. at 32.
143
See id. at 4.
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III. ANALYSIS
Part III analyzes how various courts have dealt with pay-for-delay
agreements. First, cash payment pay-for-delay agreements are analyzed
through the lens of the decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.144 Second, the Note
looks at In re Loestrin Fe Antitrust Litigation to analyze non-cash payment
pay-for-delay agreements.145 Third, the practice of “product hopping”
and its impact on pay-for-delay agreements are examined through
analyzing New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC.146 Fourth, it
reviews the implications of the empirical economic impact of pay-fordelay agreements.147 Finally, the Note explores the need to amend the
current legislation to include specific language pertaining to pay-for-delay
agreements.148
A. Effectiveness of FTC v. Actavis, Inc.
Part III.A looks at the effectiveness of the Actavis decision by
examining the agreements the Court examined, the clarity of the language
the Court used, the test the Court used, and the fallout from the decision
rendered.149
While the Court dealt with agreements in which cash is directly paid
from one party to another, it did not look at other potential payment
methods that could be undertaken to complete pay-for-delay
agreements.150 Not examining other payment methods left a gap in the
doctrine governing pay-for-delay cases, but it is possible that the Court
intended to leave this analysis to the lower courts.151 The decision is
ineffective because it is clear that lower courts cannot agree on how to deal
with this issue, which suggests that remanding without further direction

See infra Part III.A (examining the effectiveness of FTC v. Actavis, Inc.).
See infra Part III.B.
146
See infra Part III.C (looking at the practice of product hopping).
147
See infra Part III.D.
148
See infra Part III.E.
149
See infra Part III.A.
150
See generally F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (showing that pay-for-delay
agreements not involving direct cash payments are not discussed in the opinion); In re
Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 549 (1st Cir. 2016) (describing that the court is
looking at whether to extend Actavis to non-cash payments, which shows that pay-for-delay
agreements not involving direct cash payments were not considered by the Supreme Court
in Actavis).
151
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (discussing how the Court is tasking the lower courts
with structuring the test that is to be further applied to this issue); Feldman & Frondorf, supra
note 13, at 514 (noting that the Supreme Court left the structuring of the test to the lower
courts).
144
145
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could lead to another circuit split.152 If there are more circuit splits, it is
very likely that the issue will get petitioned to the Supreme Court again
because a circuit split is the reason the Court originally heard the case.153
This circular pattern is a public policy concern because the issue of payfor-delay agreements continues to take up time and resources in the court
system without being resolved.154 Although only looking at cash payment
agreements could lead to more circuit splits, the clarity of the language
used in the opinion could also contribute to another split.155
The decision’s effectiveness erodes when looking at the Court’s
analysis of which pay-for-delay agreements violate antitrust laws, which
vaguely referred to other justifications as reason for the payment. 156 The
Court continued to reference vague, broad terms such as “large sum” and
“higher-than-competitive profits” when it discussed market power. 157
Yet, the Court did not explicitly define “large sum” or “higher-thancompetitive profits” in its opinion.158 By using this vague language and
152
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (explaining that the lower courts have reached
different conclusions on the application of antitrust law to pay-for-delay agreements);
Hemphill, supra note 33, at 1557 (denoting that some federal appellate courts have permitted
pay-for-delay settlements, while some federal appellate courts have not permitted pay-fordelay agreements).
153
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (stating that the reason the Court granted certiorari
was because there was a split in the circuit courts as to how to apply antitrust law to
settlement agreements that result from Paragraph IV patent litigation). Compare In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332–37 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(affirming the Eastern District of New York decision to grant a motion to dismiss state
antitrust claims involving a patent settlement), and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.,
466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the lower court that the defendant’s
conduct involving a patent settlement did not violate antitrust law), with In re K–Dur
Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 214–18 (3d Cir. 2012) (outlining the court’s decision to
agree with the FTC in saying that pay-for-delay agreements in drug patent litigation are
inherently anticompetitive and, therefore, are presumptively in violation of antitrust law).
154
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012) (explaining that the first factor that the Supreme Court of the
United States takes into consideration when reviewing a writ of certiorari is whether there is
a circuit split on the issue, which implies that there should be a concerted effort to avoid
circuit splits); Hernandez v. Hendrix Produce, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 538, 540 (S.D. Ga. 2014)
(presenting that one must follow court rules to attempt to conserve court resources); Kirsten
Z. Myers, Removing the Mass Misperception: A Consideration of Environmental Torts and Removal
Jurisdiction Under the Class Action Fairness Act, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 161, 182 (2016) (specifying
that circuit splits are not favored because they’re inconsistent and confusing).
155
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (displaying the Court’s referencing broad and vague
terms when discussing the decision’s specifics and failure to define them); Feldman &
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 514 (expressing that the Supreme Court held that “large and
unjustified” reverse payments are anticompetitive, but the Court does not explain what is
large and unjustified).
156
See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (expounding that there may be
other justifications for the reverse payment such as avoiding court costs and other expenses).
157
See id.
158
See id.
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remanding back down to the lower courts, the Court made it entirely
possible for circuits to interpret those terms differently, and another
circuit split could result.159 More circuit splits means more time and
resources are taken out of the court system, which is a public policy
concern.160
Also, the vagueness of the language used by the Court could make it
difficult for plaintiffs to file a complaint that could survive a motion for
summary judgment.161 Complaints could struggle to survive the motion
because, if the terms that define what must be shown in a complaint are
broad and vague, then establishing a genuine dispute that can be
supported by admissible evidence will be very difficult.162 If surviving a
motion for summary judgment is difficult, plaintiffs will likely be deterred
and will possibly not bring suit due to the high cost that litigation usually
incurs.163 If plaintiffs do not bring suit to challenge anticompetitive payfor-delay agreements and the current statutory scheme stays in place, this
anticompetitive practice will go unchecked, and pharmaceutical
companies will be allowed to continue to profit off of consumers by
keeping the cost of medication high. 164 The Court’s ineffectiveness in
providing clarity to its vague language harms application of the test it set
up.165

See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012) (elaborating that a circuit split occurs when “a United States
court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States
court of appeals on the same important matter”).
160
See id. (articulating that one of the first factors that the Supreme Court considers when
reviewing a writ of certiorari is whether there was a circuit split on the matter, which
suggests that circuit splits ought to be avoided). See also Hernandez v. Hendrix Produce,
Inc., 297 F.R.D. 538, 540 (S.D. Ga. 2014) (specifying that one must follow court rules to attempt
to conserve court resources); Myers, supra note 154, at 182 (noting that circuit splits are
disfavored because of their inconsistency in application and they confuse prospective
plaintiffs);
161
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B) (stating that one must support a motion to dismiss by
showing that the records cited to “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact”).
162
See id. (expressing that, to support a motion to dismiss, one has to show that the other
party either cannot establish a genuine dispute, produce admissible evidence to support the
alleged claims, or both, which implicitly means that a complaint must prove a genuine
dispute that can be supported with admissible evidence to survive a motion for summary
judgment).
163
See Jarod Bona, How Much Does It Cost to Litigate An Antitrust Case?, ANTITRUST ATT’Y
BLOG (June 5, 2014), https://www.theantitrustattorney.com/2014/06/05/much-costlitigate-antitrust-case/ [ https://perma.cc/ZKX5-AZJT] (detailing the steps and various
costs involved with each step of antitrust litigation).
164
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2 (estimating that pay-for-delay agreements
cost consumers $3.5 billion every year).
165
See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231–32 (2013) (explaining the factors of the
test set up by the Supreme Court).
159
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While the Court was ineffective when defining the moving parts
involved in this issue, it was also ineffective when setting up its rule of
reason test.166 By running a five-factor analysis and then instructing the
lower courts to structure a new test, it is possible that the new tests created
by the circuit courts could affect, and even go against, the analysis
performed in the opinion. 167 Because each circuit court could create a
different test, this instruction has opened up another avenue toward a
circuit split, which is a public policy concern.168 Inevitably, the decision in
Actavis, Inc. has created a large fallout.169
The fallout and ineffectiveness from the Actavis, Inc. decision gave rise
to a new kind of pay-for-delay agreement that opted for conveying a
benefit as opposed to cash as payment for delaying generic entrance into
the market by taking advantage of some of the gaps left by the Actavis, Inc.
decision.170
B. Effectiveness of In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation
The decision in In re Loestrin was effective, in part because it produced
congruence among the circuits.171 The court’s decision in In re Loestrin not
See id. at 2231–32.
See id. (discussing the factors by which to analyze antitrust impact); id. at 2238 (leaving
the lower courts to determine a new rule of reason test).
168
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012) (articulating that the Supreme Court considers circuit splits
when reviewing a writ of certiorari, which suggests that circuit splits ought to be avoided).
See also Hernandez v. Hendrix Produce, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 538, 540 (S.D. Ga. 2014); Myers, supra
note 154, at 182.
169
See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 550 (1st Cir. 2016) (considering
whether Actavis extends to indirect cash payments involved in settlement agreements
resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation); King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 2015) (exploring if Actavis extends to indirect cash
payments involved in pay-for-delay agreements); New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis
PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642–43 (2d Cir. 2015) (showing how the Actavis PLC employed the
practice of product hopping with its drug Namenda to manipulate the market at the
expiration of the patent for the drug).
170
See King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 393 (discussing the effects of Actavis on
pay-for-delay agreements that do not involve direct cash payments). Compare Actavis, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. at 2223–38 (showing that pay-for-delay agreements not involving direct cash
payments are not discussed in the opinion), with King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 93
(explaining how the patentee drug manufacturer agreed not to make an authorized generic
that would compete with the generic company’s product in exchange for a delay).
171
See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550 (noting how Actavis has been extended to include
non-cash payments by King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. in the Third
Circuit); King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 413 (ruling that Actavis covers pay-fordelay agreements that involve indirect cash payments); In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litigation,
94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 243 (D. Conn. 2015) (elucidating that it is the large and unjustified
transferring of value from patent holder to alleged infringer that produces an
anticompetitive agreement); United Food and Com. Workers Loc. 1776 & Participating
166
167
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only brought the First Circuit in line with the Third Circuit but also
aligned with a growing trend among courts throughout the country.172 By
aligning itself with the other courts around the country, the court in In re
Loestrin avoided the potential pitfall of another circuit split. 173 Avoiding
another circuit split is important because it follows the public policy of
avoiding bogging down the court system with circular lawsuits by
bringing clarity as to how to determine which agreements are
anticompetitive.174
The court’s decision in In re Loestrin was also effective in clarifying the
language of the Actavis, Inc. opinion as it pertained to non-cash
payments.175 It effectively noted how the term “payment,” which has a
broad meaning, was a key term used repeatedly throughout the Supreme
Court’s Actavis, Inc. opinion.176 This clarification is important for ensuring
that a complaint will survive a motion for summary judgement, which
would encourage affected consumers to bring suit, and thus, deter
pharmaceutical companies from using pay-for-delay agreements for fear
of lawsuits.177 Although the court was effective in clarifying the language
of the Actavis, Inc. opinion, it left an important piece of language in the
opinion ambiguous.178
Emp’rs Health & Welfare Fund, et al. v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., et al., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1052,
1069–70 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (denoting that value can be measure in several different ways); Time
Ins. Co. v. Astrazeneca AB, 52 F. Supp. 3d 705, 710 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (finding that agreements
involving non-cash forms of payment are under the purview of the Actavis decision).
172
See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550–51 (showing that other various courts around the
country had decided to extend Actavis to include non-cash payments); In re Aggrenox, 94 F.
Supp. 3d at 243 (explaining that it is the large and unjustified transferring of value from the
brand-name drug company to the generic company that qualifies as a reverse payment);
United Food and Com. Workers Local 1776, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1069–70 (holding that there are
several different ways to determine value outside of monetary means); Time Ins. Co., 52 F.
Supp. 3d at 710 (presenting that anticompetitive agreements under Actavis could take other
forms besides a direct cash payment).
173
See supra Part III.A (discussing the resulting fallout of the Actavis, Inc. decision,
including another possible circuit split).
174
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012); Hernandez, 297 F.R.D. at 540; Myers, supra note 154, at 182.
175
See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 550 (1st Cir. 2016) (specifying the
breadth of the key terms used by the Supreme Court in its Actavis decision).
176
See id. (stating that the term “payment” was not only a key term used in the Actavis
opinion but also a term that suggests a broader category).
177
A motion to dismiss must show the complaint does not “establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence
to support the fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B). The requirements for establishing a motion
to dismiss mean that, implicitly, it is important for the party filing the complaint to
understand clearly what must be alleged in the complaint. Id. The court’s clarification of the
term “payment” established an element of what a party had to allege in the complaint to
establish a genuine dispute. In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
178
See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550 (explaining that the court purposely did not define
the terms “large” and “unjustifiable”).
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Because the court did not define what type of figures would be
necessary for proving a payment was large and unjustifiable, it has
purposely, inefficiently added vagueness to the kind of facts a plaintiff
must allege to show that a payment was large and unjustifiable. 179 The
court not specifying what constitutes a large and unjustifiable payment
could potentially make it harder for a plaintiff to file a lawsuit that could
survive a motion for summary judgment.180 As discussed in the previous
section, if it is difficult to survive a motion for summary judgment, it is
likely that high litigation costs will put off many would-be plaintiffs.181
While these inefficiencies could potentially affect future litigation
involving pay-for-delay agreements, pharmaceutical companies switched
to product hopping in a display of their adaptability.182 This practice was
favored because it circumvented the various court rulings that some payfor-delay agreements violate antitrust law by not involving pay-for-delay
agreements to attack the generic market.183 The next part of this Note
analyzes the opinion in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC to
examine the practice of product hopping and how it has influenced payfor-delay agreements.184
C. Effectiveness of New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC
When ruling on New York’s challenge that product hopping was
anticompetitive in nature under antitrust law, the court was effective
when it clarified what qualifies as anticompetitive behavior when making

The court determined that defining “large” and “unjustifiable” would place an
unrealistic burden at the pleading stage on prospective plaintiffs wishing to bring suit. In re
Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550. While the court’s rationale is logical on its face, it conflicts with
the standards of surviving a motion to dismiss outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
180
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B) (stating that must support a motion to dismiss by showing
that the records cited “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that
an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact”).
181
See supra Section III.A.1 (looking at direct cash payment pay-for-delay agreements). See
also Bona, supra note 163 (detailing the steps and various costs involved with each step of
antitrust litigation).
182
See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642–43 (2d Cir. 2015)
(showing that the plaintiff alleged that the case involved the defendant practicing product
hopping); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1016–17 (defining the process of product hopping and
how pharmaceutical companies use the practice to avoid imminent patent cliffs).
183
See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 642–43 (discussing how Actavis PLC used a substitution
strategy with its drug Namenda to manipulate the market at the expiration of the patent for
the drug); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1016–17 (specifying how companies use product hopping
instead of pay-for-delay agreements due to the litigation problems that surround pay-fordelay agreements following FTC v. Actavis and its progeny).
184
See infra Part III.C.
179
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allegations in a complaint but hand-cuffed the courts by making its ruling
too narrow and easily avoidable.185
The court in Actavis PLC used a clear, concise definition of what is
sufficient to allege unlawfully anticompetitive product hopping. 186 This
clear and concise definition is very helpful for plaintiffs writing a
complaint to initiate a lawsuit and survive a motion for summary
judgment.187 Because of high litigation costs, the easier and more likely a
complaint is to succeed, the more likely plaintiffs are to bring suits when
anticompetitive behavior is discovered. 188 Thus, more successful suits
alleging pay-for-delay agreements or product hopping would deter
anticompetitive practices, save consumer access to generic drug prices,
and prevent a competitive market from being negotiated out of the
industry.189
While the court was clear in defining its test for determining product
hopping’s anticompetitive nature, it diminished its effectiveness when it
narrowed its use too much by determining that only hard switches could
be considered coercive.190 Although the court reasoned that a soft switch
did not rise to the level of coercion, failing to rule that a soft switch could
be anticompetitive unnecessarily constricted the test.191 It is possible that
a pharmaceutical company could perform a hard switch by prefacing it
with a soft switch to give the illusion that the company allowed consumers
freedom of choice while switching between the drugs.192 By performing
See discussion infra notes 186–93 and accompanying text.
See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 654 (stating that a plaintiff must show allege “a monopolist
combines product withdrawal with some other conduct, the overall effect of which is to coerce
consumers rather than persuade them on the merits . . . and to impede competition”); id.
(finding that only hard switches were anticompetitive while soft switches were permissible).
187
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B) (explaining that the plaintiff must support a motion to
dismiss by showing that the records cited to “do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support
the fact”).
188
See Bona, supra note 163 (detailing the steps and various costs involved with each step
of antitrust litigation).
189
Contra Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 33 (suggesting that the legitimization of
settlements in patent litigation encouraged pharmaceutical companies to settle and caused a
lowering of the average level of competition in the pharmaceutical market).
190
See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 648 (2d Cir. 2015)
(describing how Actavis PLC went about withdrawing Namenda off the market and
deeming it to be what is known as a hard switch); Levy, supra note 37, at 278 (showing that
the Second Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction because of the hard-switch that
occurred with Namenda).
191
See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 655 (reasoning that a soft switch leaves both the old and
new product available, but not recognizing that a soft switch can be used to veil a hard
switch, which was ruled by the court to be anticompetitive and against antitrust law).
192
See id. (reasoning that, because a soft switch leaves both the old and new product on the
market while the switch is occurring, soft switches allow consumers freedom of choice based
185
186
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this maneuver, brand-name drug companies have found a loophole to
circumvent antitrust scrutiny by dressing their hard switch up with a soft
switch.193
Because of the competitiveness distinction made in Actavis PLC
between soft and hard switches, Warner Chilcott successfully prefaced a
hard switch with a soft switch to enable a product hop, as was discussed
in the previous paragraph.194 The fact that anticompetitive product
hopping is still occurring shows that the distinction between hard and soft
switches made by Actavis PLC has been ineffective.195 Because the lineage
of cases governing pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping have
been ineffective overall, there is a need for specific regulation governing
pay-for-delay agreements.196
D. Pay-for-Delay: Economic Impact
When looking at the empirical study on pay-for-delay agreements
performed by Ruben Jacobo-Rubio et al., there are several instances that
would suggest the current patent litigation climate is encouraging
anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreements.197 First, the drastic difference
in value gained for settling patent litigation provides proper motivation
for both sides to reach an anticompetitive settlement.198 Second, the
difference in dispute value added by an increase in a drug’s sales shows
that the stratification between the value of deterrence and the value of
entry only continues to grow.199 Finally, the authors’ suggestion that the
on merits); id. at 648 (outlining that a hard switch is when a pharmaceutical company
completely withdraws a drug all at once while introducing a new replacement into the
market at the same time); id. at 655 (defining a soft switch as introducing the new drug to the
market with the old drug still being available while the pharmaceutical company slowly
switches over to the new drug).
193
See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247, 268–69 (D. Mass. 2017) (finding that
there could not have been an anticompetitive hard switch because Asacol, Asacol HD, and
Delzicol were all available prior to the switch).
194
See id. at 268 (stating that the hard switch was between Asacol and Delzicol); id. (noting
that Asacol and Asacol HD were both on the market at the same time so it could not be a
hard switch, implicitly deeming this to be a soft switch); id. at 267–68 (determining plaintiffs
did not have a product hopping claim pertaining to Asacol HD).
195
See id. at 267–68 (showing that Warner Chilcott was able to successfully perform a
product hopping while circumventing the Actavis PLC decision).
196
See infra Part III.D.
197
See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 5 (discussing how, in general, the findings of the
study suggest that the lower average competition in the pharmaceutical market has dropped
while drug sales have nearly doubled).
198
See id. at 29 (examining the difference between the value of deterrence and the value of
entry).
199
See id. at 31 (exploring the difference in the value of deterrence added and the value of
entry added when one adds a single dollar to a drug’s sales).
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trends between pre- and post-Schering-Plough imply that competition has
lowered on average since the decision lays bare pay-for-delay agreements’
opposition to public policy.200
The gap between the value of deterrence and the value of entry is quite
large, with the value of entry making only 5.1% of the value of
This gap suggests that not only are brand-name
deterrence.201
pharmaceutical companies extremely interested in settling patent
litigation to restrict and deter competition but also generic pharmaceutical
companies are extremely motivated to do the same in order to ensure they
realize whatever kind of return on investment the generic companies can
get.202 If both brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies are
extremely interested in settling patent litigation, it follows that the most
likely outcome of patent litigation is a settlement. 203 This result goes
directly against the stated public policy goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and antitrust law, which aims to stimulate generic competition in the
pharmaceutical market, because the current system motivates brandname and generic pharmaceutical companies to form an agreement that
delays generic entry into the pharmaceutical market. 204 The important

200
See id. at 33 (noting how, while average dispute values have dropped 60% since the
decision in Schering-Plough, average drug sales have almost doubled, which implies that the
competition in the pharmaceutical market has been lowered since Schering-Plough); Ruth
Barber Timm, The Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine and the Pharmaceutical Benefit
Management Industry: A Proposed Exception to the Copperweld Holding, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 309,
313 (1996) (denoting that one of the public policy aims of antitrust law is to prevent
anticompetitive business behavior).
201
See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 29 (elaborating on the fact that the average value of
entry, $236.8 million, comprises only 5.1% of the average value of deterrence, $4.6 billion).
202
See id. (reviewing how winning patent litigation is worth far more to the brand-name
pharmaceutical companies than it is to generic pharmaceutical companies); Tahk, supra note
5, at 491 (explaining that the goal of a for-profit business is to make profits).
203
See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 33 (suggesting that the cause for the 60% brandname win rate at the district court level could be explained by a growing trend of weak
patents settling litigation more often than strong patents); Tahk, supra note 5, at 491
(specifying that creation of profits is the goal of a for-profit business).
204
See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 29 (stating that the average value of entry, $236.8
million, only made up a small percentage of the average value of deterrence, $4.6 billion,
which suggests that brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies are motivated to
settle); Tahk, supra note 5, at 491 (exploring the fact that for-profit businesses operate for the
sake of making profits); Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (showing that the goal of the Hatch-Waxman
Act was to stimulate generic competition in the pharmaceutical market); Feldman &
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (articulating that the main goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was
to balance drug innovation with generic market entry); Timm, supra note 200, at 313
(expounding that antitrust laws seek to prevent anticompetitive business behavior within
economic markets).
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implication of this opposition to public policy is that the cost of the
elimination of competition is passed on to the consumers.205
While the large difference between the value of deterrence and the
value of entry shows the motivation of brand-name and generic
pharmaceutical companies to settle, viewing these values through the
context of drug sales reveals that every new dollar of drug sales is
widening the gap between the values and thus strengthening the
motivations of each party.206 With every new dollar in a drug’s sales, the
value of deterrence increases by $7.19 and the value of entry increases by
$0.19.207 This discrepancy between the increase in the value of deterrence
and the increase of the value of entry means that every new dollar of a
drug’s sales is 378% more valuable to brand-name pharmaceutical
companies, which suggests every new dollar in a drug’s sales increases
the motivation of brand-name pharmaceutical companies to restrict and
deter competition.208 Logically, this discrepancy means that every time
drug sales increase, the motivation of brand-name pharmaceutical
companies to restrict and deter competition increases, which goes against
the public policy goals outlined in the Hatch-Waxman Act.209
Considering the gap between the value of deterrence and the value of
entry, the authors examined the data before and after the decision in
Schering-Plough and found that both values dramatically decreased after
the decision even though drug sales had nearly doubled. 210 The decrease
in both values led the authors to suggest that settlements in patent
litigation lower the average level of competition in the pharmaceutical
market.211 This decrease of value in the face of mounting drug sales that
has resulted in lower average competition is yet another example of how
settlements of patent litigation tend to directly oppose the public policy of
205
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that the FTC estimated that pay-fordelay agreements cost consumers $3.5 billion every year); Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 33
(specifying that the pay-for-delay agreements have been associated with a drop in the
bargaining surplus from $4.9 billion to $1.3 billion, or a drop of 73%).
206
See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 31 (reviewing the large difference between the
average value of deterrence added and the average value of entry added when one dollar is
added to the average drug sales).
207
See id.
208
See id.
209
See Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (stating that the intended goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act
was to increase avenues for generic competition into the pharmaceutical market in an
attempt to increase competition); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (expounding
upon the fact that balancing drug innovation with quick generic market entry for the purpose
of creating competition was the main goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act).
210
See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 33.
211
See id. at 4 (exploring how the average level of competition was depressed in the period
after Schering-Plough, which suggests that pay-for-delay agreements have lowered the
average level of competition in the pharmaceutical market).
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increasing generic competition in the pharmaceutical market. 212 The
findings of the Jacobo-Rubio study show that settlements of patent
litigation are harming generic competition in the pharmaceutical market,
which suggests that there is a need to legislate this issue specifically. 213
E. Pay-for-Delay: The Need for Legislation
The brand-name and generic drug companies’ willingness to game
the system at each step shows the need for stricter regulation of pay-fordelay agreements and product hopping. 214 The study performed by the
FTC estimated that pay-for-delay agreements cost consumers $3.5 billion
per year.215 With a couple of months of monopoly profits worth hundreds
of millions of dollars, there is incentive for brand-name drug companies
to continue their anticompetitive behavior and utilize the tools made
available to them.216
The practice of product hopping is particularly effective when
considering the practice along with DPS laws.217 If a product hop is
successful, a brand-name company will have effectively extended its
patent monopoly while also eliminating the possibility of generic
competition for an extended period of time. 218 Because the new product
See id. at 29 (suggesting that the dramatic drop in both the average values of deterrence
and entry suggests that pay-for-delay agreements have lowered the average level of
competition in the pharmaceutical market); Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (discussing that the goal
of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase generic competition entry in the pharmaceutical
market); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (articulating that the main goal of the
Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance drug innovation with generic market entry).
213
See infra Part III.E (investigating the need for legislation that specifically regulates payfor-delay agreements and product hopping).
214
See supra Part III.A (exploring the holes and exploitations in Actavis, Inc.); supra Part III.B
(examining how courts dealt with indirect cash payment pay-for-delay agreements); supra
Part III.C (considering the practice of product hopping); supra Part III.D (reviewing the
economic impact of pay-for-delay agreements).
215
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2.
216
See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 503 (stating that just a few months of
monopoly profits could net hundreds of millions of dollars); Tahk, supra note 5, at 491
(explaining that the purpose of organizing and operating a for-profit business is to make
profits); Lacie Glover, Here are the Top Selling Drugs in the US, TIME (June 26, 2015),
http://time.com/money/3938166/top-selling-drugs-sovaldi-abilify-humira/?xid=soc_
socialflow_twitter_money%20 [https://perma.cc/GY3J-JU3Z] (showing the top drug
earners for the year 2014 with Sovaldi making $658 million per month, Abilify making $655
million per month, and Humira making $600 million per month).
217
See supra Part II.D (elucidating DPS law and function, and how product hopping can
potentially take advantage of this area of law).
218
See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 655 (2d Cir. 2015)
(specifying that Actavis PLC’s planned withdrawal of Namenda IR would create “a
‘dangerous probability’ that Defendants would maintain their monopoly power after
generics enter the market”).
212
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will enjoy patent exclusivity for a period of time, the generic market will
lag behind, and pharmacists will not have generic medications they can
substitute for the new brand-name medication.219 This lack of generic
medications available for substitution means that there is no cheaper
alternative to compete with the brand-name medication and provide
balance to the marketplace.220
At their core, both pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping
contrast with the public policy reasons that drive the Hatch-Waxman
Act.221 One of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s main goals is to provide generic
competition to the brand-name pharmaceutical industry by providing
avenues for generic competitors to enter the market.222 Because the
purpose of pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping is to delay or
prevent generic competitors from entering the market, these practices are
operating in direct opposition to the Hatch-Waxman Act’s public policy
goals.223 The opposition between industry and public policy generated by

219
See id. at 661 (saying that generics cannot just move into the new market for the new
brand-name drug because the companies must restart the FDA approval process over again);
Carrier, supra note 23, at 1018 (explaining that product hopping drags down competition
because it circumvents DPS laws).
220
See MASSON & STEINER, supra note 110, at 1 (conveying that drug product selection laws
allow pharmacists to substitute generic equivalents for brand-name drugs in certain cases).
221
See Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (showing that stimulating drug innovation while also
creating a quicker route to generic approval and entry into the market was the public policy
goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1012 (denoting that the public
policy reasons behind the Hatch-Waxman Act were to increase generic competition in the
pharmaceutical industry and foster innovation within the pharmaceutical industry);
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (articulating that the main public policy goal
driving the Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance “adequate patent protection for pioneer
inventors with promoting the rapid introduction of generics once this patent protection has
expired”).
222
See Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (expounding that a public policy goal of the Hatch-Waxman
Act was to provide new avenues for low-cost generic drugs to gain approval and entry to
the market); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 501 (noting that the Hatch-Waxman Act
“created a pathway to generic entry meant to incentivize the speedy introduction of generic
drugs to market”).
223
See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (elaborating that pay-for-delay
agreements are arrangements where a patent-holding party enjoying exclusivity in the
market pays a competitor to delay entry into that market for the purpose of preserving the
patent-holding party’s current exclusivity); Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (considering the
differences between soft and hard switches that are utilized in product hopping); In re Asacol
Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247, 256–58 (D. Mass. 2017) (reviewing the
anticompetitiveness of hard switches involved in product hopping); Carrier, supra note 23,
at 1016–22 (exploring the process and market entry timing associated with product hopping,
rendering the practice anticompetitive); Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (explaining that drug
innovation growth and creation of quicker routes to generic approval and entry into the
market were among the public policy goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act).
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holes in the legislation warrants amendments that both modify existing
language within and add new language to the Hatch-Waxman Act.224
IV. CONTRIBUTION
The continual use of pay-for-delay agreements and the practice of
product hopping shows the need for amendments to current legislation.225
First, this part of the Note proposes amendments to the Hatch-Waxman
Act to limit and deter pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping. 226
Second, it considers commentary and counterarguments against the
proposal.227
A. Proposed Amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act does not do enough to limit and deter
First, Section IV.A.1
anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreements.228
proposes an amendment to the language of the Hatch-Waxman Act to
include the implementation of a cap system that restricts the terms of payfor-delay agreements.229 Second, Section IV.A.2 proposes penalties in the
form of increased Medicaid Drug Rebate Program rates.230
224
See infra Part IV.A (proposing amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act that are aimed at
deterring and limiting pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping). See also JacoboRubio, supra note 121, at 33 (noting how average dispute values have dropped 60% since the
decision in Schering-Plough and average drug sales have almost doubled, which suggests the
competition level in the pharmaceutical market has been lowered since the decision); Timm,
supra note 200, at 313 (specifying that one of the public policy aims of antitrust law is to
prevent anticompetitive business behavior); Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (saying that creating a
quick avenue to generic approval and entry into the market while maintaining innovation in
the drug market was the public policy goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act); Carrier, supra note
23, at 1012 (observing the public policy reasons driving the Hatch-Waxman Act were to
stimulate generic competition in the pharmaceutical market and foster innovation within the
pharmaceutical market); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (expounding that the
main public policy goal driving the Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance “adequate patent
protection for pioneer inventors with promoting the rapid introduction of generics once this
patent protection has expired”).
225
See supra Part III.D (discussing the need to amend current legislation to combat the
current issues that are being experienced due to pay-for-delay agreements and the practice
of product hopping).
226
See infra Part IV.A.
227
See infra Part IV.B.
228
See supra Part III.D (noting the need to amend current legislation governing pay-fordelay agreements and product hopping).
229
See infra Section IV.A.1.
230
See infra Section IV.A.2 (explaining the proposed penalty of increased rebate rates
involved with the Medicaid Rebate Drug Program). See also CENTERS FOR MEDICAID &
MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICAID DRUG REBATE PROGRAM, MEDICAID.GOV (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-rebateprogram/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q73G-S6Q8] (stating that the Medicaid Drug
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Regulatory Cap System

The Hatch-Waxman Act should be amended to restrict the terms of
pay-for-delay agreements.231 The restrictions should include a cap on the
length of the delay and the amount of value, both direct and indirect, the
agreement can convey.232 The language that would be added to the statute
would read as follows:
Purpose: The purpose of this amendment is to put restrictions
upon the length and amount of value conveyed in agreements
that delay the entry of generic pharmaceuticals.
(a) Definitions
(1) Independent Third Party. An individual, appointed
by the court, with an expertise in estimating the entire cost
of legal litigation.
(b) If a settlement agreement is reached during patent
litigation involving generic entry under 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(b)(2)(A)(iv), the terms of said agreement must adhere to
the following:
(1) the agreement may not delay the entry of the ANDA
filer’s generic equivalent past the thirty-month stay of
FDA approval triggered at the filing of the litigation; and
(2) the value conveyed from one party to another cannot
exceed the entire estimated cost of the litigation as
determined by an independent third party.233
Rebate Program is a government program through which drug companies enter into a
national rebate agreement with the government “in exchange for state Medicaid coverage of
most of the manufacturer’s drugs”); id. (showing that innovator drugs must pay 23.1% of the
Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) as a rebate and non-innovator drugs must pay 13% of
AMP as a rebate); id. (denoting that the maximum rebate amount for innovator drugs is
100%); 2 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 27:22 MEDICAID DRUG REBATE PROGRAM (2017) (saying
that in order for drug manufacturers to receive payments from Medicaid, they must enter
into national rebate agreements with the government for medication given out through state
Medicaid).
231
See supra Part III (exploring how a lack of clarity about what constitutes a large,
unjustified payment suggests that limits should be set on pay-for-delay agreements).
232
See supra Part III (expressing how both the amount of money and length of delay to
generic market entry are the central issues surrounding the anticompetitive nature of the
settlement agreement).
233
The length restriction being set at thirty months was chosen to align with the earliest
date of FDA approval of the abbreviated new drug application to ensure that the new generic
equivalent can enter the market at the earliest possible date. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012).
The value restriction was chosen because it aligns with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Actavis,
Inc. that says that settlement agreements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation rise
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Penalties Via Increased Medicaid Drug Rebate Program Rates

The Hatch-Waxman Act should also be amended to include penalties
in the form of increased Medicaid Drug Rebate Program rates. 234 If the
penalties proposed are incurred, the rebate rate of the said innovator drug
involved, if any, will be increased, and the rebate rate of any authorized
generic of the drug by the offender will be increased. 235 The amendment
to the Act would look as follows:
Purpose: This amendment aims to impose penalties for
anticompetitive behavior involved with patent litigation
settlements and the practice of product hopping to limit and
deter their use.
(a) Definitions
(1) Product Hopping. A new version of brand-name drug
is introduced and subsequently the old version of the
brand-name drug is withdrawn within eighteen months.
(b) If a settlement agreement does not comply with the
regulations for agreements arising from litigation involving
generic entry under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv) or is found to
have been engaged in anticompetitive product hopping, the
penalties, in addition to any penalties or injunctions ordered by
the court, will be as follows:
(1) any innovator drug, as defined by the Medicaid Drug
Rebate Program, that is listed in the Medicaid Rebate
Program involved will have its rebate rate increased from
23.1% to 100% for six months starting from the date the
decision is handed down;
(2) any non-innovator drug, as defined by the Medicaid
Drug Rebate Program, associated with an innovator drug
under subsection (a)(1) or involved with the
anticompetitive behavior under section (a) in the Medicaid
Rebate Program will have its rebate rates increased from
13% to 19.5% for six months starting from the date the
decision is handed down;
to the level of antitrust scrutiny when the amount of value transferred exceeds to
approximate cost of litigation. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013).
234
See supra Part II.C (discussing drug product selection laws and their effects on brandname and generic drugs).
235
See CENTERS FOR MEDICAID & MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 230 (explaining the rebate
rates for innovator drugs and their authorized generic counterparts).
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(A) if a non-innovator drug under subsection (a)(2)
has not entered the market at the time the decision is
handed down, the six-month period of the Medicaid
Drug Rebate Program rebate rate increase will
commence upon said drug’s entry into the market.236
B. Commentary
The intent behind these amendments is to deter and limit the
anticompetitive behavior that is typically seen with pay-for-delay
agreements and product hopping. 237 Restricting the length of pay-fordelay agreements will ensure that generic competition enters, if it is ever
going to, the market at the earliest possible date and also aligns with the
thirty-month stay already mandated by the statute. 238 The restriction on
the amount of value that can be transferred from one party to another
accepts the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Actavis, Inc. that settlement
agreements from patent litigation that transfer more value than the
estimated cost of litigation trigger antitrust scrutiny.239 The combination
of these restrictions aligns with public policy concerns.240 By outlining the
acceptable terms of settlement agreements of these types, future plaintiffs
will have clarity as to what they need to sufficiently allege when filing a
complaint in a suit involving an anticompetitive settlement agreement,
which makes it easier to survive a motion for summary judgment. 241 By
making it easier to survive a motion for summary judgment, challenges to

The Medicaid Drug Rebate Program rebate rate increase for innovator drugs from
23.1% of AMP to 100% AMP was chosen because it is the maximum rebate rate allowed by
the program. CENTERS FOR MEDICAID & MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 230. The six-month
period of rebate rate increase was chosen to mimic the 180-day exclusivity period granted
for successful first filers of abbreviated new drug applications.
21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(aa). The Medicaid Drug Rebate Program rebate increase for noninnovator drugs from 13% to 19.5% was chosen because it is a 50% increase of the original
rebate rate. CENTERS FOR MEDICAID & MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 230.
237
See supra Part II (showing the history of anticompetitive behavior associated with payfor-delay agreements and product hopping).
238
See supra Section IV.A.1 (proposing a restriction to the length of settlement agreements).
239
See supra Section IV.A.1 (detailing the proposed restriction to the transfer of value
involved with settlement agreements).
240
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012); Hernandez v. Hendrix Produce, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 538, 540 (S.D.
Ga. 2014) (presenting that one must follow court rules to attempt to conserve court
resources).
241
See supra Section IV.A.1 (showing the proposed limitations on settlement agreements
from patent litigation); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B) (stating that plaintiff must support a motion
to dismiss by showing that the records cited to “do not establish the absence or presence of
a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support
the fact”).
236
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anticompetitive behavior will be encouraged.242 The combination of
restrictions also lends clarity to the courts by defining the line between
competitive and anticompetitive settlement agreements. 243 This clarity
will help avoid a circuit split that could result in circular lawsuits, which
is a public policy concern.244
The penalties that are levied for anticompetitive behavior are
intended to deter drug companies from practicing anticompetitive
measures while supplementing an important government program. 245
Penalties not only punish the unwanted behavior but also further the
public policy of maintaining public health by significantly lowering the
cost of medication for Medicaid on certain drugs.246
One could argue that the proposed amendments are an unfair
restriction on trade and the rights of a patent holder.247 While it is true
that they can be seen this way, these restrictions do not completely
eliminate settlement agreements but simply set boundaries necessary to
foster competition.248 They also do not prevent the transition from an old
drug to a newer version.249 The effect of the restrictions is outlining what
is to be considered acceptable, competitive behavior involving settlement
agreements and product hopping and ensuring that anticompetitive
behavior involving those areas is deterred and limited.250
Another counterargument is that if drug companies have found a way
to game the system and circumvent legislation before, what is preventing
them from doing it again?251 Even though drug companies have
continued to find ways to sidestep regulations, it is important to ensure

242
See Bona, supra note 163 (detailing the steps and various costs involved with each step
of antitrust litigation).
243
See supra Section IV.A.1 (explaining the proposed restrictions on settlement agreements
resulting from patent litigation).
244
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012); Hernandez, 297 F.R.D. at 540.
245
See supra Section IV.A.2 (outlining the proposed amendments that punish
anticompetitive behavior involving pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping).
246
See supra Section IV.A.2 (demonstrating the proposed amendment that imposes
penalties for the anticompetitive behavior of pay-for-delay agreements and product
hopping).
247
See supra Part IV.A (reviewing the proposed amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act).
248
See supra Section IV.A.1 (expounding upon the proposed amendment to the HatchWaxman Act). Contra FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that it is the belief of
the FTC that all pay-for-delay agreements are anticompetitive).
249
See supra Section IV.A.2 (considering the proposed amendment to the Hatch-Waxman
Act).
250
See supra Part IV.A (presenting the proposed amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act).
251
See supra Part II (chronicling the legal background of pay-for-delay agreements and
product hopping).
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that the behavior does not go unchecked. 252 The issue of anticompetitive
pay-for-delay agreements and anticompetitive product hopping
negatively affects public policy by producing a large amount of cases in
the court system and affecting the ability to maintain public health. 253 The
restrictions and penalties proposed by this Note seek to win back some
ground on these public policy concerns.254
V. CONCLUSION
In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act was introduced. The Hatch-Waxman
Act, among other things, created a new avenue for generic drug
companies to challenge brand-name patents, known as Paragraph IV
Certification. When a generic drug company files for Paragraph IV
Certification, the brand-name drug companies can sue the filer for patent
infringement in what is known as Paragraph IV patent litigation, which
triggers an automatic thirty-month stay of approval by the FDA. The
settlement agreements that resulted from this type of litigation gave rise
to the anticompetitive practices of pay-for-delay agreements, in which a
patent holder pays a generic to stay out of its market, and product
hopping, where a patent holder produces and patents a new version of a
drug with only minor improvements in an attempt to avoid the
approaching expiration date of its drug patent.
The Supreme Court ruled on pay-for-delay agreements in FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., holding that these agreements could rise to the level of
antitrust scrutiny when the cash payment involved exceeds the
approximate cost of litigation. This decision led to the Third Circuit, in In
re Loestrin, in addition to a host of other courts around the country,
extending the decision in Actavis, Inc. to cover pay-for-delay agreements
involving indirect cash payments. Then, the Second Circuit was the first
to rule that product hopping could be anticompetitive and violate
antitrust law in Actavis PLC.
All of the continued litigation has exposed gaps in the Hatch-Waxman
Act. These gaps present the need for amendments to the current
legislation that deals specifically with deterring and limiting
anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping. This
Note proposes amendments to the current version of the Hatch-Waxman
Act that would implement a cap system that restricts pay-for-delay
agreements and create penalties in the form of increased Medicaid drug
252
See supra Part II (articulating the history of pay-for-delay agreements and product
hopping, which shows how pharmaceutical companies have always found a way to get
around regulations and court rulings).
253
See supra SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012); Part II.
254
See supra Part IV.A (proposing amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act).
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rebate rates involved with the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program for
anticompetitive behavior involving pay-for-delay agreements and
product hopping. While there are several different counterarguments to
the proposed amendments, such as violation of patent rights, the
unnecessary restriction of trade, and the pharmaceutical industry’s ability
to game the system, the need for amendments that deal with
anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping is still
clear because pharmaceutical companies continue to game the system.
Their track record shows that they will continue.
Sean Boyle*
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